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Abstract: 
 
This note computes revenue-maximising tax rates in personal income taxes in the presence 
of consumption taxes. It finds that the traditional Laffer analysis, which neglects the effects 
of marginal tax rates on consumption, overestimates the magnitude of revenue-maximising 
tax rates. The bias caused by this oversight is computed. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The so-called Laffer curve embodies the well-established proposition that maximum tax 
revenue is reached somewhere between 0 and 100 per cent of marginal tax rates. As the 
literature has shown, this result stems from the interaction of two opposing effects: the 
mechanical and the behavioural effects caused by marginal tax rate alterations1. The former 
captures, in the absence of any behavioural reaction, the pure arithmetical change in tax 
revenue, whereas the latter quantifies the revenue change due to the impact of marginal tax 
rates on economic activity. Although the notion of the Laffer curve is applicable to any tax as 
well as to the tax system as a whole, most of the empirical and theoretical work on the Laffer 
curve has focused on personal income taxation (PIT). However, the traditional formulation of 
the Laffer curve in PIT has omitted the impact of marginal tax rates on consumption2. As long 
as PIT marginal tax rates modify household disposable income and therefore taxable 
consumption, changes in PIT marginal tax rates also alter the tax revenue from consumption. 
This oversight has important implications for the graphical profile of the Laffer curve and on 
the magnitude of the revenue-maximising marginal tax rates. In this note the computation of 
revenue-maximising tax rates is remodelled in order to take into consideration the impact of 
PIT marginal tax rates on consumption tax revenue. 
 
2. Model and results 
 
Let us assume an economy that levies taxes on personal income and on consumption according 
to the following setting: 
 
1.- TY = TY(y, ζ) is the personal income tax function, where  y  is taxable income and 𝜁 is the 
applicable tax schedule, defined in terms of a vector of increasing marginal tax rates τ⃗ =
(τ0, τ1, … , τk) and a set of  sequential thresholds A⃗ = (a0, a1, … , ak). 
 
2- TC = TC(V, ς) represents the consumption tax function, defined on disposable income, V =
y-TY, according to a set of tax-inclusive rates, including VAT and excises, levied on the Q 
categories of goods and services exchanged in the economy, ς = (t1, t2, … , tq). 
 
Given this general outline, if an individual taxpayer,  i , earns taxable income, yi, has an average 
propensity to consume χi, and his total consumption, Ci, is distributed among the Q existing 
goods according to the weights wqi , such that wqi =
Cqi
Ci
 and ∑wqi = 1, then, replicating 
Creedy and Gemmell (2006), his or her total tax liability as a consumer as well as an income 
generator will be TTi = TYi + TCi , where: 
 
                                                             
1 Using different approaches, Saez (2004), Giertz (2009), Creedy (2011, chapter 13) and Saez et al. (2012) 
present detailed discussions on this issue.  
2 In a recent paper by Carey et al. (2015) the implications of changes in the consumption tax rate on the 
elasticity of taxable income (ETI) is explored. For the case of a quasi-linear utility function, these authors find 
that ETI is unaffected by the level of the consumption tax rate. This, however, does not imply that the PIT 
Laffer curve is also unaffected. 
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      𝑇𝑌𝑖 = 𝜏𝑘𝑖(𝑦𝑖 − 𝑎𝑘𝑖
′ )      [1] 
and 
  𝑇𝐶𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 ∙ [ 𝑦𝑖 − 𝑇𝑌𝑖]       [2] 
in which τki and aki
'  denote, respectively, the marginal tax rate and the effective threshold of 
the tax bracket into which the taxpayer’s taxable income falls and αi represents the taxpayer’s 
effective tax rate on consumption - i.e. αi = χi ∙ ∑ wqitq
Q
q=1 –. The analytical expression for the 
effective threshold is a'ki = ∑ aj ∙ (
τj-τj-1
τki
)
k-1
j=0 .
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2.1 The Laffer curve  
 
 The so-called Laffer curve can be characterised by identifying its peak. This locus of 
maximum revenue meets the following elasticity condition ηTti ,τk
= 0. Therefore, when 
consumption and income taxes are simultaneously taken into account, the maximum tax bill 
paid by an individual taxpayer when his or marginal tax rate, τki , changes will be reached when
4: 
 
𝜂𝑇𝑦𝑖𝜏𝑘𝑖
= −
𝑇𝑐𝑖
𝑇𝑦𝑖
∙ 𝜂𝑇𝑐𝑖𝜏𝑘𝑖
     [3] 
where 𝜂𝑇𝑦𝑖𝜏𝑘𝑖
 and 𝜂𝑇𝑐𝑖𝜏𝑘𝑖
 are, respectively, the elasticity of PIT and consumption tax revenue 
with respect to the PIT marginal tax rate. The former, as obtained by Creedy (2011, page 277) 
and Creedy and Gemmell (2014), can be expressed as: 
 
𝜂𝑇𝑦𝑖,𝜏𝑘𝑖
=
𝑦𝑖 − 𝑎𝑘
𝑦𝑖 − 𝑎𝑘𝑖
′ − (
𝑦𝑖
𝑦𝑖 − 𝑎𝑘𝑖
′ ) ∙
𝜏𝑘𝑖
(1 − 𝜏𝑘𝑖)
∙  𝜂𝑦
𝑖,(1−𝜏𝑘𝑖
)
 
 
where the latter is derived from [2] after some mathematical manipulation and rearrangement of 
terms - see Appendix-: 
 
𝜂𝑇𝑐𝑖,𝜏𝑘𝑖
= −
(1 + 𝜂𝛼𝑖,𝑉𝑖) ∙ 𝜏𝑘𝑖
𝑉𝑖
∙ [𝑦𝑖 ∙ 𝜂𝑦𝑖(1−𝜏𝑘𝑖)
+ (𝑦𝑖 − 𝑎𝑘)] 
 
As a consequence, when income and consumption taxes are considered, the relevant (Laffer) 
revenue-maximising marginal tax rate for taxpayer  i , τki
LI+C , will be given by:  
 
                                                             
3 As highlighted by Creedy and Gemmell (2006), equation [1] and the analytical expression of the effective 
threshold result directly from rearranging the expression: 
𝑇𝑌𝑖 = 𝜏𝑘𝑖 ∙ 𝑦𝑖 − ∑ 𝑎𝑗 ∙ (𝜏𝑗 − 𝜏𝑗−1)
𝑘
𝑗=1
+ 𝜏𝑘𝑖 ∙ (𝑦𝑖 − 𝑎𝑘) 
which represents formally the application of the tax schedule to taxable income, yi. 
 
4 This derives directly from the fact that ηTti ,τki
=
Tyi
Tti
∙ ηTyi ,τki
+
Tci
Tti
∙ ηTci ,τki
. For the explicit form of the 
elasticity functions ηTyi ,τki
 and ηTci ,τki
, see the Appendix. 
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𝜏𝑘𝑖
𝐿𝐼+𝐶 =
(1−
𝑎𝑘
𝑦𝑖
)∙𝜂𝑦
𝑖,(1−𝜏𝑘𝑖
)
−1 −𝛼𝑖∙(1+𝜂𝛼𝑖,𝑉𝑖)∙[1+(1−
𝑎𝑘
𝑦𝑖
)∙𝜂𝑦
𝑖,(1−𝜏𝑘𝑖
)
−1 ]
1+{(1−
𝑎𝑘
𝑦𝑖
)∙𝜂𝑦
𝑖,(1−𝜏𝑘𝑖
)
−1 −𝛼𝑖∙(1+𝜂𝛼𝑖,𝑉𝑖)∙[1+(1−
𝑎𝑘
𝑦𝑖
)∙𝜂𝑦
𝑖,(1−𝜏𝑘𝑖
)
−1 ]}
  [4] 
 
However, standard Laffer analysis neglects the impact of PIT marginal tax rates on 
consumption, which implies assuming that ηTciτk
= 0. This restricted and unrealistic 
assumption implies that standard practice computes revenue-maximising tax rates, τki
LI , using 
equation [5], instead of  the correct expression, 𝜏𝑘𝑖
𝐿𝐼+𝐶, as given in equation [4]: 
 
𝜏𝑘𝑖
𝐿𝐼 =
(1−
𝑎𝑘
𝑦𝑖
)∙𝜂𝑦
𝑖,(1−𝜏𝑘𝑖
)
−1
1+(1−
𝑎𝑘
𝑦𝑖
)∙𝜂𝑦
𝑖,(1−𝜏𝑘𝑖
)
−1
     [5] 
 
As a result, dismissing the behavioural effect of PIT marginal tax rates on consumption 
generates biased revenue-maximising tax rates. To be specific, the next condition holds: 
 
𝜏𝑘𝑖
𝐿𝐼+𝐶 − 𝜏𝑘𝑖
𝐿𝐼 = −
𝛼𝑖∙(1+𝜂𝛼𝑖,𝑉𝑖)
(1+(1−
𝑎𝑘
𝑦𝑖
)∙𝜂𝑦
𝑖,(1−𝜏𝑘𝑖
)
−1 )∙[1−𝛼𝑖∙(1+𝜂𝛼𝑖,𝑉𝑖)]
   [6] 
 
and consequently the following proposition can be stated: 
 
Proposition 1: if αi > 0  the neglect of the effects of income taxation on consumption tax 
revenue overestimates the peak of the PIT Laffer curve, τk
LI > τk
LI+C, as long as αi <
1
1+ηαi,Vi
. 
 
Note that αi <
1
1+ηαi,Vi
 is a mild condition, since the regular range of actual effective tax rates 
on consumption are well below that boundary. Thus, according to proposition 1, commonly 
computed revenue-maximising tax rates, τk
LI , are misleading as they are higher than the actual 
revenue-maximising tax rates, τk
LI+C. In other words, if consumption tax revenue is taken into 
account, then maximum tax revenue is reached at lower PIT marginal tax rates than otherwise. 
As a consequence, revenue forecasting is overestimated and the “prohibitive range” of the 
Laffer curve is wider than normally assumed. 
 
By way of illustration for the case of Spain, the left-hand side of the graph in Figure 1 exhibits 
the Laffer curves for the median Spanish taxpayer in 20085. Both Laffer curves, regarding and 
neglecting consumption tax revenue (VAT+Excises), are depicted. As shown, taking account of 
consumption tax revenue reduces PIT revenue-maximising tax rates from 0.598 to 0.556, 
                                                             
5This median Spanish taxpayer in 2008 is characterised by the following parameter values ηαi,Vi= 0.1150, 
αi = 0.0863, ηyi,(1-τki)
= 0.67. 
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shrinks the available tax revenue set and expands the “prohibitive” area of the relevant Laffer 
curve. As a result, misguided revenue forecasts follow. As depicted in the right-hand side of the 
graph in Figure 1, for an equiproportional increase in 2008 marginal tax rates, revenue 
miscalculation rises with the level of income. Table 1 displays the median difference generated 
in the computation of Laffer marginal tax rates on 578,157 Spanish taxpaying units. These data 
contain information regarding the magnitude and nature of the incomes of 578,157 taxpaying 
units, as well as the composition of their consumption with regard to 262 distinct goods. The 
Appendix briefly describes the data used. As Table 1 displays for the whole country, the median 
difference reached 6.7 percentage points which represents over 20% in relative terms. This 
median bias varies according to the background peculiarities of the taxpayer, such as the level of 
income, the region of residence or the size of the tax unit. These figures indicate that Laffer 
marginal tax rates are significantly overestimated in Spain when the impact of PIT marginal tax 
rates on consumption tax revenue is omitted. 
 
Figure 1. Impact of consumption tax revenue on PIT Laffer curves and total tax revenue (simulation) 
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Table 1.  Median values of the distribution of maximising-tax rate difference due to neglecting the 
influence of PIT marginal rates on consumption tax revenue (2008). 
 (𝝉𝒌𝒊
𝑳𝑰+𝑪 − 𝝉𝒌𝒊
𝑳𝑰) 
(𝝉𝒌𝒊
𝑳𝑰+𝑪 − 𝝉𝒌𝒊
𝑳𝑰)
𝝉
𝒌𝒊
𝑳𝑰+𝑪
 
Whole tax population -6.7 20.78 
By tax brackets (2008) in € 
0  - 17,707.20 -4.8 8.95 
17,707.20 – 33,007.20  -7.9 36.34 
33,007.20  -  53.407,20 -8.6 55.96 
> 53.407,20 -6.5 18.99 
By region of residence 
Andalusia -7.3 22.77 
Aragon -6.5 21.13 
Asturias -7.3 26.54 
Balearic Islands -6.5 18.66 
Canary Islands -6.7 20.14 
Cantabria -7.1 23.44 
Castile and León -6.6 20.44 
Castile-La Mancha -6.7 19.36 
Catalonia -6.2 19.90 
Valencian Community -6.7 18.86 
Extremadura -7.4 20.71 
Galicia -7.0 21.23 
Madrid -6.5 20.93 
Murcia -7.3 20.36 
La Rioja -6.5 18.78 
Ceuta and Melilla -7.8 29.13 
By size of tax unit 
One family member -6.5 21.05 
Two family members -6.8 22.11 
Three family members -7.0 21.06 
Four family members -6.9 20.14 
Five or more family members -7.0 18.66 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
This note models how consumption taxes may affect the revenue power of the tax system when 
PIT marginal tax rates change. It is found that not taking into consideration the effect of PIT 
marginal tax rates on consumption overestimates the revenue impact of marginal tax rates. This 
implies that the reported standard revenue-maximising tax rates, the so-called Laffer tax rates, are 
systematically higher than the actual Laffer tax rates, that is to say they are higher than those 
which take account of consumption tax revenue. This result has significant implications for 
personal income tax design. 
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Appendix 
 
This Appendix derives the analytical expressions for ηTyi ,τki
 and ηTci ,τki
 and succinctly 
describes the data used. 
 
 Derivation of analytical expressions for ηTyi ,τki
 and ηTci ,τki
. 
As shown in Creedy (2011, page 277) and Creedy and Gemmell (2014), given the income 
tax function TYi = τki(yi-aki
' ) and a'ki = ∑ aj ∙ (
τj-τj-1
τki
)
k-1
j=0 , the elasticity of the taxpayer’s 
tax bill with respect to his/her maximum marginal tax rate, τki , will be expressed as -the 
prime indicates partial derivative-: 
 
𝜂𝑇𝑌𝑖 ,𝜏𝑘𝑖
= 𝜂′𝑇𝑌𝑖 ,𝜏𝑘𝑖
+ 𝜂′𝑇𝑌𝑖 ,𝑦𝑖
∙ 𝜂𝑦𝑖,𝜏𝑘𝑖
    [A.1] 
 
where η'TYi ,τki
 is the direct effect on revenue caused by the change in τki , which equals 
yi-ak
yi-aki
'  ,  η'TYi ,yi
 is the (partial) revenue elasticity with respect to income that takes on 
yi
yi-aki
'  
and ηyi ,τki
is the taxable income elasticity that can be rewritten in terms of the more 
popular net-of-tax rate as ηyi ,τki
=
τki
τki
-1
∙ ηyi(1-τki)
. Bearing all these considerations in mind, 
the result is: 
 
𝜂𝑇𝑦𝑖,𝜏𝑘𝑖
=
𝑦𝑖−𝑎𝑘
𝑦𝑖−𝑎𝑘𝑖
′ − (
𝑦𝑖
𝑦𝑖−𝑎𝑘𝑖
′ ) ∙
𝜏𝑘𝑖
(1−𝜏𝑘𝑖
)
∙  𝜂𝑦
𝑖,(1−𝜏𝑘𝑖
)
    [A.2] 
 
In relation to ηTci ,τki
, if we depart from the tax function TCi = αi ∙ [ yi-TYi], then  
 
𝜂𝑇𝐶𝑖 ,𝜏𝑘𝑖
= [𝜂′𝑇𝐶𝑖,𝛼𝑖
∙ 𝜂𝛼𝑖,𝑉𝑖 + 𝜂′𝑇𝐶𝑖 ,𝑉𝑖
] ∙ 𝜂𝑉𝑖,𝜏𝑘𝑖
   [A.3] 
 
This can be rewritten as: 
 
𝜂𝑇𝐶𝑖 ,𝜏𝑘𝑖
= [1 + 𝜂𝛼𝑖,𝑉𝑖] ∙ [𝜂′𝑉𝑖,𝑦𝑖 ∙ 𝜂𝑦𝑖,𝜏𝑘𝑖
+ 𝜂′𝑉𝑖,𝜏𝑘𝑖
]    [A.4] 
 
as η'TCi ,αi
= η'TCi ,Vi
= 1 and ηVi,τki
= η'Vi,yi ∙ ηyi,τki
+ η'Vi,τki
. Furthermore, if we take 
into account that η'Vi,yi =
(1-τki
)∙yi
Vi
, η'Vi,τki
= -
(1-ak)∙τki
Vi
 and, as above, that ηyi,τki
=
τki
τki
-1
∙
ηyi(1-τki)
, the final equation is  
𝜂𝑇𝑐𝑖,𝜏𝑘𝑖
= −
(1+𝜂𝛼𝑖,𝑉𝑖)∙𝜏𝑘𝑖
𝑉𝑖
∙ [𝑦𝑖 ∙ 𝜂𝑦𝑖(1−𝜏𝑘𝑖)
+ (𝑦𝑖 − 𝑎𝑘)]    [A.5] 
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 Data 
The individualised calculation of the expressions generated in this paper requires having 
available a microdatabase with individualised information regarding income and 
consumption expenditure. In the case of Spain there exist two separate bases of microdata 
with individualised information on incomes and consumption: the PIT tax returns panel 
(PIT panel) and the Family Expenditure Survey (FES). The first is elaborated annually by 
the Tax Administration on the basis of tax returns filed and includes highly detailed 
information on declared incomes and other socioeconomic variables. In turn, the FES, 
elaborated annually by the Spanish Statistical Office, incorporates the details of household 
consumption structure, disaggregated into 262 categories of goods. The microdata used in 
this paper are the result of the statistical matching between the two databases. The 
procedure followed has consisted of imputing to each PIT tax return its structure of 
consumption on the basis of the information contained in the FES.  The statistical fusion 
was performed for 2008. This database is available on request from the author.  
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